Memorandum on a new financial architecture and new regulations by Ghilarducci, T et al.
investigaci6n econ6mica, val. LXVIII, 267, enero-marzo de 2009, pp. 147-161 
Memorandum on a new financial 
architecture and new regulations 
TERESA GHILARDUCCI 
EDWARD NELL 
STEFAN MITTNIK 
EcKHARD PLATEN 
WILLI SEMMLER 
RAPHAELE CHAPPE* 
The financial crisis is global and is deeply rooted in a decade-long misuse 
of the financial market for rent-seeking. The financial industry has largely 
abandoned its role as a service industry, supposedly charging reasonable 
fees for the services of spreading risk and allocating capital and credit. Instead 
it provides a market for corporate control-mergers and acquisitions- and a 
casino for betting on or hedging practically any kind of risk -the derivatives 
market-. Finance, broadly understood, has gone from 2% of d1e American 
economy to 20% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) since the early 1990s 
-yet iliere is litde or no evidence that the value of its services to consumers 
and businesses are word1 one-fifili of GOP-. The growth of finance seems to 
be largely due, on ilie one hand, to deregulation, leading to liberalization of 
capital accounts all over d1e world, and to financial innovations on d1e oilier. 
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But this innovation has led to the development of new financial instruments 
that are not well understood by their users or even their initiators. Financial 
derivatives, Mortgage Backed Securities (~ms), Collaterized Debt Securities 
(cos), Collaterized Debt Obligations (coos), and so on, have clearly been 
misused. But besides that, some critics argue that they were misconceived 
as well: the formulas for pricing and using them rested on unacceptable 
assumptions about the distribution of probabilities. 
After capital market liberalizations, many countries experienced major 
episodes of financial instability, sometimes with devastating effects on 
economic activity, resulting in boom and bust cycles. These tended to bring 
about declining economic activity, large output losses and a terrible impact 
on the low income segments of the population and small businesses, indeed, 
all those unable to insure themselves against large financial and real shocks. 
The bursting of the real estate bubble in the United States (us), Spain, 
and the United Kingdom (UK), and the world-wide fall-out for the us and 
Euro-Zone credit and banking system has already had severe real effects, 
triggering what may be a long and deep recession in the us and many other 
econo1rues. 
It was in order to prevent just such events that many countries instituted 
financial regulation after the Great Depression of the 1930s. The new 
regulatory institutions provided public screening and monitoring of the 
financial markets, and required firms and banks to adhere to strict standards 
of accounting and to publicly reveal information on assets, debt and earnings. 
The theory was that more and better information tamed exuberance and 
made prices conform to the risks banks were taking relative to their 
capitalization. Fast unravelling of these long-standing regulations -starting in 
the 1990s- allowed extreme leveraging on an unprecedented economic scale 
with untested instruments. 1 With insufficient financial market regulation 
this leveraging carried great and poorly understood risk. 
1 \XIith high leveraging risk will be extreme with: 1) inexperienced and loose supervision; 2) no 
disclosure requirement; 3) no screening and monitoring of financial institutions and 4) no secure 
safety net for the financial institutions (for example, insurance for bank deposits as enacted for us 
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The recent collapse has roots in the inadequate understanding of the 
new financial instruments, especially subprime mortgages and securitized 
mortgage instruments. The flaws in these instruments magnified into a credit 
crisis and a global financial market meltdown. The use of these terms is 
not hyperbolic. Since the end of last year, central banks have tried to help 
d1e private banking sector with an extraordinary injection of liquidity, even 
including the purchase of bad assets, for example from Bear Stearns. But 
this has not worked; the contagion of financial panic continues, sometimes 
subdued, but on occasion, virulendy. The Group of Seven (G-7), anticipating 
dire consequences to financial markets, met in April 2008 to consider 
recommendations of the Financial Stability Forum (rsr). But nothing 
happened, only a declaration, and this had no effect. 
In early Fall, the European Union (Eu) Parliament required the EU 
commission to draft new directives for strengthening and harmonizing 
financial regulations in Europe. In the us, in September, Secretary Paulson 
brought to Congress a $700 Billion rescue plan to bail out failing investment 
banks. Initially d1e idea was to buy up d1eir non-performing assets. Congress 
rejected dus, accelerating the stock market downturn. Then it accepted 
a modified version, including capital injections into weakened banks, as 
proposed in the UK. By this time d1e contagion had already spread, first to 
d1e UK and d1en to Europe. The guarantee of bank deposits by the Irish 
Government had put d1e UK and other EU Countries under pressure to do 
d1e same. The electronic bank tuns became too dangerous. The 27 Head 
of States of the EU met in Paris at the beginning of October to suggest a 
joint rescue plan for Europe and d1e global economy. The G-7 followed 
banks in the 1930s and in Britain and Ireland in the midst of the credit crises in October 2008). 
MacAvoy and Millstein pointed out the excessive risk taking and corporate Governance failure in 
the Enron case 2001, which triggered the Sarbancs-Oxley Act of 2002, sec Paul McAvoy and Ira 
M . .Nlillstein's, The Remrrmt Ctisis i11 Corporate GotJermmce (New York, Palgravc-i\hci\lillan, 2004). 
Additionally, politician:;, regulators, financial economists and financial market modcllcrs now admit 
that the financial dynamics of the global economy and its markets has not been sufficiently understood 
:m far. Economic development now often moves as boom-bust cycle~. see a detailed analysis in \X1i!\i 
Semmler, "Asset prices, booms, and reces~ions" (New York, Heidelberg, 2006). 
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d1is up and put forward the suggestion of a new international financial 
architecture to be decided by a summit meeting in December in New York. 
Although some core European countries (UK, France, Germany) decided 
on national guarantees for bank lending operations and agreed to guarantee 
deposits, iliis was not enough to calm d1e stock market or loosen up ilie 
credit markets. 
As iliese efforts took place credit around ilie developed world became 
frozen. To build up confidence the us treasury took additional action to 
purchase stocks of investment firms and banks ilireatened by bankruptcy. 
This helped a litde to calm down the stock market and improve the climate 
for credit. But now a real recession is looming on ilie horizon, calling not 
only for a rescue plan but also for a new and stronger stimulus package. 
The focus should shift now to ilie long run, to a new financial architecture. 
Here are some points of agreement among concerned academics and 
policymakers regarding financial market bubbles, new financial architecture 
and regulations. 
THE BACKGROUND OF THE CURRENT FINANCIAL 
AND REAL ESTATE MARKET BUBBLE AND MELTDOWN 
To start with there are good grounds to distrust ilie market valuations of 
financial assets, boili before ilie collapse and nmv, after ilie bursting of ilie 
bubble. The (inlperfectly understood) financial innovation of re-packaged 
and securitized subprinle mortgages resulted in boili significantly overpriced 
houses and securities. The risky loans were sold because iliey were securitized 
ilirough CDOs -which were supposed to make ilie economy safer by spreading 
risk-. Instead, d1eir widespread use in the mortgage market contributed to 
a typical financial and real estate market bubble very similar to oiliers iliat 
the us and other advanced macro economies have seen.2 These bubbles 
2 These go back a long time: there was the !'lorida real estate bubble in the early 1920s, the stock 
market bubble in the late 1920s, the tech stock bubble in the late 1990s, the real estate bubble in the 
ur..: in the cady 1990s, and the us since 2000, and the bubble in the futures market for oil and other 
resources, in recent times. 
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have tended to happen more frequently, tl1e more tl1e financial market has 
been deregulated.' 
Usually, as a financial bubble develops, asset price inflation and credit 
expansion move in tandem. The bubble will be particularly pronounced 
when ilie financial sector expands more rapidly tl1an ilie rest of tl1e economy, 
as has happened in ilie us starting in ilie early 1990s. This pattern can be seen 
in ilie subprinle market: wiili a low cost of borrowing (low interest rates) 
and expected prices of subprime assets rising (due to expected adjustable 
interest rate), incentives developed to hold an excessive amount of subprinle 
enos. This also created incentives for banks to finance such holdings tl1tough 
loans (even iliough ilie collateral might be suspect): eventual sales of such 
securities seemed to promise huge profits. Yet, ilie data on returns from 
enos is scarce, and iliere were only a few academic studies on how large tl1e 
expected margins might be, as compared to returns on oilier assets. 
Furiliermore, ilie pricing of tl1ese assets compounded tl1tough a pattern 
of interaction known as 'relative pricing'. As soon as one investtnent bank 
placed a new credit product in tl1e market, oilier financial market players 
built on iliat price, even though it may well have been arbitrary, drawing 
on ilieir models, to extrapolate ilie prices of even more complex products. 
Since iliere was no specific, well established market to evaluate such assets 
-or the actual profitability of enos and ilieir more risky tranches- the initial 
prices did not have a sound basis. It is now clear tl1at the practice of relative 
pricing was all along inadequate and dangerous. Moreover, tl1e models used 
to price credit derivatives were based on artificial default intensities tl1at had 
no link to tl1e real potential risk of large-scale default if tl1e real estate market 
went through its natural cycles. So ilie credit market went down due to 
3 The Glass~Stcagall Act was introduced in the 1930s, to prevent this sort of bubble. It restricted 
banks from holding financial assets other than treasury bonds and prohibited a bank holding company 
from owning other financial companies. But it was repealed in 1999 by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act. There is a debate as to whether the weakened controls were a chief cause of the current crises, 
because investment banks with commercial insured deposits arc in better health than rhnsc wirhout. 
But both are in trouble. A major contribution of the 1999 deregulation to the bubble is that it helped 
expand leverage by creating large actors such as Citibank. 
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unanticipated higher default risk and lower recovery rates. It is now clear 
that the entire industry severely overpriced credit derivatives, and tl1at it sold 
tl1ese products to customers tl1at are now suffering losses. 
Financial bubbles have negative effects, in addition to the inlmediate 
damage they inflict when they burst. For example, tl1ey may produce or 
enhance uneven income distribution (financial tides lift yachts, but not all 
other boats) and they may lead to misallocation of resources (e.g. the huge 
build up of optical fiber in the us). And even before it bursts, the bubble 
creates financial instability; other sectors may be pulled into unwarranted 
booms. When a bubble bursts, it generates huge externality effects: falling 
asset prices in the bubble will pull down other asset prices, the value of 
collateral will fall, and loans will be called in; credit markets will contract, 
and financial institutions will suffer. Many 'innocent' agents -who made 
no unwarranted or speculative decisions- will be dragged down, and this 
will spill over significantly onto the real side of the economy, reducing 
employment and output. 
RISK 
The contours of a bubble emphasize the two risks that, without a 
coordinating agent to manage tl1em, feed into one another and make the 
financial system particularly fragile. A strilting aspect of the turmoil has 
been the extent of weaknesses in risk management, especially in regard to 
two components which are always present. 
Specific or idiosyncratic risk 
This applies to the individual financial institution. It is the risk arising from 
high expected margins, based on cheap sources of funding for extremely 
leveraged speculative or Ponzi positions, often compounded by lack of 
adequate internal risk assessment in the financial institution itself, and lack 
of diversification where all parties in an industry follow the same strategies. 
We also tend to find problems such as lack of sufficient capital requirements, 
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underrated risk by rating agencies, and lack of accountability. A recent 
example involving most of the above is the way many financial firms have 
been selling Lehman Brothers debt insurance against its bankruptcy. These 
swaps were assets held by investors for retums and by financial institutions 
to meet capital requirements and for hedging purposes. Since the risk to 
Lehman was lmderappreciated, the swaps' value is not known (it is estimated 
at $600 billion), and the size of d1e losses on d1ese swaps and how d1ey will 
affect various institutions is unknown. 
General or common risk 
This arises from movement of the entite market, such as higher interest 
rates, falling consumption and investment demand, sudden increases in risk 
aversion or perception (emerging credit defaults, swaps and spreads rising), 
correlated risk through the entite market when extreme events (liquidity 
drought) happen, as during the current crisis. 
Widespread build-up of overpricing of securities can then lead to the 
emergence, even d1e sudden emergence, of a dangerous level of common 
risk. In od1et words the build up of specific risk can lead to a common risk. 
The fear of Lehman swap downgrades can lead to more credit problems. 
Economists note that bubbles can have good effects depending on their 
character. For example some bubbles can leave d1e economy significandy better 
off as firms invest in productive capacity, which might even include better 
labor relations with job training and higher wages and income in the long 
nm.' The recent financial bubble is coincident with slow productivity growd1, 
stagnating us household income, and higher poverty rates, and measures 
of increased innovation ate not readily available. Therefore it is likely that 
except for the larger than average growth in office buildings and housing 
4 An example of a good bubble with beneficial effects: the technology bubble in the LiS in the late 
1990s. The bubble burst in 2000~2001, but the expansion lasted ten years with significant economic 
and wage growth. It's worth observing that recent financial market innovations did enhance economic 
growth and facilitated the purchase of houses for the low income sector, as well as providing credit 
for small and medium sized enterprises. 
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stock, this bubble went too far and will cause as it bursts tremendous 
costs in lost output. The od1er cost of a bubble burst is a wariness about 
financial institutions. Such scepticism can result in a 'lost-trust overhang'. 
We are already seeing the effects in mid October as people move away from 
all financial instruments towards cash, and blame or even picket Wall Street 
financial stewards. Even banks move away from each oilier as ilie London 
InterBank Offered Rate (LIBOR) soars. As middle class people flee from 
financial markets, iliey may stop accumulating financial assets while we see 
banks becoming chary of lending. 
To sum up, bubbles in some form may be unavoidable, but overly 
swollen bubbles will burst in a very cosdy way; dus said, bubbles can be 
contained, and if iliey are, iliey may have some positive effects, even enough 
to outweigh the negatives. 
BUBBLES SHOULD BE CONTAINED BY POLICIES, RISK MANAGEMENT, 
REGULATIONS AND OVERSIGHT -SOME PRINCIPLES 
Common iliemes of the current discussions among national governments 
and ilie G-7 are: greater transparency, greater disclosure, and stricter risk 
management by firms. Yet ilie discussion should go beyond iliese easily 
agreed upon characteristics for an adequately functioning financial system. 
A set of beliefs and political structures evolved iliat caused regulation to 
fail to keep up wid1 ilie institutional changes over dllrty years iliat transformed 
financial markets from an intermediary to a rent-seeker. Regulators assumed 
that d1e financial sector was a lot more competent ilian it was. Regulators 
assumed iliat firms and d1e industry really had d1e dazzling technical skills 
d1at they displayed in ilieir quantitative risk models, and iliat d1ese supposed 
skills were relevant to real world markets and enabled d1em to price and 
manage risk better ilian d1e regulator could. CEO salaries -some ilie size of 
the budgets of medium sized towns and large school districts- were surely 
paid for value received; iliis added to ilie assumption of competency. 
Yet, it is clear now the industry did not have ilie proper pricing and 
risk management tools. In addition, necessary market corrections had been 
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suppressed by deliberate actions of central authorities removing regulation 
and creating, for generations of market participants, a fum belief that asset 
values could keep growing. We are now witnessing serious discussion of 
the best practices for long term financial management, financial market 
regulation and adequate, long term oriented tools, and on the regulation 
and oversight of other financial institutions. This discussion should not be 
directed toward entirely removing or avoiding financial bubbles or banning 
speculation, for example short selling or leveraging. First, this may be too 
much to ask of any government, but second, bubbles don't have to be 
s11ppressed, but they do have to be tontaimd. 
What academics have proposed 
for a financial regulatory framework 
a) The early reforms emphasized personal accountability of the executive decision-
makers only with long term incentives, particularly the top CEOs of financial 
institutions (see the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act5). 
b) Academics have been consistent in advocating better pricin.g and risk management. 
Risk analysis should always take the possibility of a major crisis into account. Prices 
need to be fair and transparent to all market participants under all circumstances, 
so that the payoffs of contracts can be realistically expected to be recovered. Inside 
financial institutions risk control divisions should be set up, assessing also system-
wide break-downs of trading. Proper risk assessments should not only be made 
through independent rating agencies, which typically consider single firms, but 
also through federal and international agencies, which should assess the likehl1ood 
of a major market meltdown based on research (as was available before the current 
crisis -international and federal oversight of rating agencies as introduced by the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act), see also point (c) below: 
c) Capital requirements should be increased significantly for financial institutions -in 
particular those that are not required by law to hold reserves at the Central Bank-. 
Leverage has to be limited to a reasonable level. It has also been suggested to enforce 
pro cyclical capital requirements. This means that the banks are forced to build up 
liquidity in a boom in order to be able to use it in a recession. \X'hen the capital 
5 The Sarbanc:::-Oxlcy Act of 2002, H.R. 3763. Sarbancs-Oxlcy Act, Pub.L. no. 107-204 (July 30, 
2002). 
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requirement is raised in a recession, this will accelerate the downturn since it may 
intensify a credit crunch or make credit more expensive. Capital requirements, in 
particular, should be increased for new financial products, such as certain complex 
credit products.l\.{ark-to-market has to be substituted by mark-to-fundamental value. 
d) Strong incentives should be provided to financial institutions for a diversification 
of capital, so that financial institutions are discouraged to follow the same strategies 
-e.g. all holdings promising subprime coos with high expected margins and instead 
trr to invent new instruments to service the economy better. 
e) Better and faster enforcement of Basel II agreements (which do not seem to have 
been enforced much in the us), taking the global nature of the financial market fully 
into account so that international corporations cannot escape global regulation. 
According to State regulatory agencies, Basel II has been approved through the 
Federal State, at the time of the agreement, but not by the regulatory agencies of 
the States (which appear to act independently). 
J) There should be more transparency, for example, quarterly reports to regulators, 
transparency of build-ups of risky exposure by banks, investment firms, hedge 
funds, private equity firms, industries, groups of companies, and households. 
Independent scholarly work on absolute pricing of contracts in new areas of 
financial innovations has to be tmdertaken and made known publicly. The magnitude 
of renuns from assets are roughly known -for example equity returns, bond returns, 
returns from currencr and future markets- but there are no similar studies for new 
financial instruments, which industry prices in a consensus using relative pricing 
and marking to market when measuring risk. Similar to the pharmaceutical industry, 
the finance industry should go through an approval and testing process before 
launching new complex product lines on a massive scale. 
What the Financial Stability Forum (FsF) has proposed 
In d1e us, the Federal Reserve System (Fed) had, under Greenspan, attempted 
to intervene in the asset price bubbles (tech bubble), but credit and banking 
crises and a crisis in the bond market are a different matter. A judgement on 
the real pre-emptive regulatory potentials of central banks, the Fed in the us 
and the European Central Bank (ECB) in Europe, is still out. In particular, 
because the capital market liberalization and the new communication 
technology have set in motion a much greater contagion effect than trade 
liberalizations (through electronic 'bank-runs'), international cooperation 
in this area, in order to avoid the contagion effects of financial crises, is 
strongly needed. 
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Already in April the G-7 meeting had accepted a proposal by cl1e FSF, 
which has suggested actions to "Enhance Market and Institutional Resilience". 
The FSF focused on 1) increasing the capital requirements (in particular 
for complex structured credit products) and strengthening liquidity and 
risk management (especially for off-balance sheet entities); 2) enhancing 
and improving transparency and valuation through credit rating agencies; 
3) increasing the authorities' responsiveness to risk (translating risk analysis 
into action), and 4) extension of the arrangements to deal with financial 
stress and disruptions (extending Central Banks' policies to asset purchases 
and liquidity provisions for cl1e private sector). So far, at least what d1e press 
has reported, d1e increase in capital requirements seems to be high on the 
agenda. Europe has now tmdertaken numerous actions to prevent d1e financial 
meltdown from spreading to Europe, such as interest rate decrease, liquidity 
provision by cl1e ECB, rescue operation of d1e banking system d1tough loans, 
guarantees and deposit insurance, and planning an EU supervisory board 
for ilie credit system in Brussels. But as argued above, iliis is not enough for 
a new financial architecture. 
Proper practices of risk management 
The recent financial market bubble can, in part, also be attributed to a lack of 
understanding of d1e nature of underlying forces driving risk. Current risk-
management processes for market, credit and liquidity risk make a number 
of sinlplifying assumptions about the behaviour of those forces in order 
to achieve some form of analytical tractability and to reduce mad1ematical 
and computational burden.' But if real-life decisions are to be based on 
these models this is utterly unacceptable. 
6 An example is the widely adopted hypothesis that fluctuation:> in financial-asset prices over time can 
be described by a simple mathematical model, the geometric Brownian motion (GB:-.l). Assumptions 
of this nature have the consequence that they trivialize the risk present on financial markets. Widely 
observed phenomena, such as fat tails (i.e., a much larger loss potential than the Gm>J-model implies), 
asymmetries (i.e., higher than expected downside risk), correlation breakdowns (i.e., nonlinear 
dependencies across assets and markets), and volatility clustering (i.e., a strong temporal dependence 
in the propagation of risk), arc largely ruled out in current risk measurement processes. 
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Financial firms' risk management processes, vendors of risk-analysis 
software, rating agencies as well as regulatory agencies should be required to 
adopt more realistic and empirically substantiated models for risk assessment. 
Specifically, in order to determine the consequences of extreme financial-
risk constellations, certain stress-testing procedures have been established. 
However, they mainly consist of analyzing isolated, extreme events and 
do not take the interaction of such extreme events into account. Since 
-even modest- deficits in risk assessment are greatly amplified by excessive 
leveraging, the consequences of leveraging on a firm-specific, but also 
macroeconomic level need to be better understood. 
In view of these deficits, the financial sector as well as regulatory 
agencies have to devote more resources to develop sound risk assessment 
processes. 
Hedge funds and private equity 
There are otl1er potencial dangers lurking. In spite of the inlplosion of private 
equity funds and hedge funds, which has had a significant ®pact on the 
structure of us and global markets, the industry is largely unregulated in 
the us7 The above-average returns of private equity funds and hedge funds 
are in part attributable to over-leverage, use of derivatives and hedging, 
and participation in highly complex financial ttansaccions inaccessible to 
other regulated market participants. The systemic risks associated with these 
characteristics (increased market volatility, liquidity issues, effect of potential 
fund collapse on the global financial system) need to be addressed. The SEC 
has sought to establish greater transparency through mandatory registration 
of hedge fund advisers.' Under this proposal, advisers would have had 
7 There arc two key statutes desibrncd to re&rulate investment fund practices: the Investment Company 
r\ct of 1940 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. Thct:.c statutes, which were designed for 
investment companies such as mutual funds are outdated in light of recent financial innovation and 
capital markets developments. Hedge funds and private equity funds rely on exemptions (mainly 
through avoidance of public offerings) to avoid being caught by the statutes. 
8 Sec Rule 203(b)(3)-2 under the Investment Advisers Act, 17 C.F.R. !1275.203(b)(3)-2. 
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to adopt record-keeping procedures subject to periodic audits by the SEC, 
and to supply information (financial statements) to investors concerning 
their results of operations. The SEC was eventually struck down for lack 
of statutory grounding by a DC circuit decision on June 23, 2006 9 A new 
comprehensive regulatory approach for the industry is needed to manage 
systemic risk. Several bills have been introduced in d1e 11 Oili Congress 
(2007-2008), but none has really been seriously considered yet. Some guiding 
principles should include greater disclosure of portfolio diversification, risk 
profile and trading strategies, and some consideration of over-leverage. 
LIQUIDITY, INSOLVENCY AND THE ROLE 
OF THE BANKING SYSTEM 
From d1e above it follows d1at d1ere should not be any commitment to 'bail 
outs'. The public should not bear the cost of a bail out when insolvency 
arises, but the public should bear d1e cost of providing liquidity so d1at 
no insolvency arises due to a lack of liquidity, often resulting from the 
feedback effects to ilie two types of risk discussed in section 2 A) and B) 
above. Note iliat ilie view expressed here is similar to a position recendy 
taken in a draft for enhanced financial market regulation by d1e European 
parliament. Moreover ilie form of liquidity should come from the Central 
Bank, in form of new liquidity injection, swaps of new liquidity for bad 
assets (as collaterals), swap of equity for debt or bridge loans. Bridge loans 
given by d1e central bank or treasury should be given against collaterals, 
and when ilie loans are paid back ilie collaterals are transferred back to ilie 
original owners. 
Beside ilie Central Bank ilie banking system plays important role for ilie 
provision of liquidity. Some remarks on ilie banking system are needed. A 
9 Goldstein v. SEC, 451 E3d 873 (DC. Cir. 2006). Interestingly enough, the Fed was opposed to this 
mandatory registration proposal. The SEC subsequently tightened restrictions on investors who can 
invest in both hedge fund:; and private equity funds (inve:;tors must own at least 52.5 million in 
investments). This measure fails to address systemic risk and is only concerned with individual risk 
to investors. 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0
160 GHILARDUCCI, NELL, MITrNIK, PLATEN, SEMMLER AND CHAPPE 
safe banking system is needed for the operation of the real economy and 
the financial market. Yet, banking cannot exist in its modern form without 
regulation and supervision; the idea of 'free banking' is a myth -or rather 
harks back to an era in which banks provide safekeeping services, but did 
not provide the greater part of the money supply-. Money is a public good; 
taking deposits and making loans is a business, but the fact that deposits are 
the basis of the payments system constitutes a major externality. The day 
to day working of the economy depends on the payments system. If the 
smooth working of that system is undermined the effect on the economy 
is hl<ely to be disastrous. 
Banks depend on trust, and trust in turn is greatly strengthened by 
effective regulation and enforcement of well-designed rules. Banking 
customers and money market participants must be certain that banks 
and financial institutions will behave honestly; if they do not they will be 
penalized. 
Ineffective or ill-designed rules and regulations, on tl1e other hand, will 
not support trust, may permit unfair and dishonest practices, but worst of 
all, may not prevent the build-up of excessive risk. When such risk comes 
home to roost, a lot of businesses and consumers that had nothing to do 
with tl1e decisions to take on that risk will end up paying a heavy price. So 
'deregulation' is dangerous, and has, indeed, proved unwise. The changes in 
regulations allowed for more risk taking by banks and money market funds, 
witl1 the result that a large fraction of the credit essential to running the 
economy has dried up, creating problems for businesses and households 
that had nothing to do with the taking on of excessive risk. This is a major 
'negative externality', which is neitl1er fair nor reasonable. 
\'V'hy should the institutions that manage the payments system be allowed 
to take on risks in tl1e pursuit of profits -profits which they do not share wiili 
ilie rest of ilie economy- at ilie expense of ilie general public? The payments 
system should be recognized as a public good, and should be managed, not 
for profit, but in the public interest. Private enterprise may have a role in 
banking, but the pursuit of private profit must be carefully subordinated to 
the public interest. Market forces in banking may well tend to bring about 
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d1e public good, in banking as in oilier areas, but they may also run out of 
control, as we are seeing now. So it is essential d1at ilie operation of the 
payments system, and related institutions, be subject to careful supervision 
and control. 
Overall, it has to be made sure d1at lessons from this crisis will be 
firmly inlplemented to ilie benefit of generations to come, who will forget 
about ilie 2008/September market crash and recession as today's younger 
generations forgot about ilie Great Depression. 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0
